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This article investigates the Popular Front of Latvia, a public ethnopolitical movement 
that substantially contributed to the independence of the modern Republic of Latvia. The 
study aims to identify how much the movement influenced the development of ethnic na-
tionalism, which has become essential to statehood and the identification of politics. It 
continues to reinforce group inequality in this multiethnic country. The article describes 
the background and main landmarks of the movement. Content analysis of manifestos has 
been carried out to trace changes in the Popular Front’s ideological vision. It is shown 
that the shift in priorities that took place during the 1988—1991 struggle for Latvia’s po-
litical and economic independence led to a non-democratic political regime. Particular 
attention is paid to the movement’s proposals concerning the principles of statehood res-
toration and citizenship acquisition as well as to approaches to solving ethnic problems. 
The focus is on why and under what  circumstances the Popular Front dissolved itself and 
the supra-ethnic opposition, its main rivals,  left the political scene. It is argued that the 
Popular Front of Latvia created conditions both for the titular nation taking precedence 
over other ethnic groups and for the exclusion of one-third of the country’s resident popu-
lation from political life. It is concluded that, as the movement transformed and gradually 
abandoned its democratic principles, it became the main vehicle for the institutionalisa-
tion of ethnic nationalism in Latvia. 
Keywords: Republic of Latvia, Popular Front of Latvia, nationalism, ethnopolitical 
movement
Introduction
Studies of the modern Baltic States are of both theoretical and practical in-
terest since the relationship with non-titular ethnic groups still works in these 
countries on the principles of political and social inequality, despite the officially 
declared commitment to the ideals of liberal democracy. The institutionalisation 
of nationalism in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia merits special attention. The pro-
cess was driven by popular ethnopolitical movements, which, once in power, 
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both expedited Baltic independence and laid the foundations for a political re-
gime defined by experts as ethnic democracy. According to Sammy Smooha, eth-
nic democracies shape the symbols, laws and policies of the state for the benefit 
of the ethnic nation that constitutes the majority whereas minorities might be 
perceived as a threat [1]. These regimes present ample opportunities for research, 
which may stimulate the development of national movement theories, methods 
for nationalism studies, as well as the research fields of ethnopolitical mobilisa-
tion and nationalism-based identity policies of states.
Ethnopolitical movements in the Soviet Baltic republics, particularly, the Lat-
vian SSR, were a product of authorities-approved activities of the national intel-
ligentsia. Later, the general public embraced their ideas. Having gained support 
amid liberalisation and glasnost, the organisations began to exert a strong influ-
ence on political processes. The consolidation of the movements was prompted by 
the crises of the Soviet system, the demands of republican authorities for greater 
powers, growing protest and separatist sentiment, the debate on the revision of 
the Baltics’ history, and the emergence of independent grassroots associations. In 
all the three Baltic republics, an important impetus was the official Soviet policy 
of perestroika introduced in 1985 — a package of fundamental reforms aimed at 
improving the socio-political and economic situation.
The reforms were advocated by political fronts — popular civil associations 
that had their own coordinating bodies and whose aims and values enjoyed broad 
support. On the one hand, they represented opposition to ‘old Communism’ and 
struggle against the flaws and problems of the Soviet system. On the other, they 
were allies of the Union authorities headed by Secretary-general of the Central 
Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Mikhail 
Gorbachev and helped him to control both public sentiment and the activities of 
various groups and organisations. The popular fronts of the Baltics did manage 
to mobilise society. Their ultimate goal, however, was a far cry from reforms in 
the USSR.
Many studies have explored various aspects of the emergence of popular eth-
nopolitical movements in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as well as the formation 
of ethnocentric regimes in these countries. Publications that are most relevant to 
this study can be divided into two groups. The first one brings together works 
focusing on the emergence, development, and activities of ethnopolitical move-
ments in the Baltics as well as on the circumstances of their secession from the 
USSR. These are publications by Viktor Gushchin [2], Rasma Karklins and Bri-
gita Zepa [3], Stanislav Kinka [4], Mara Lazda [5], Aleksandr Potapov [6], Re-
nald Simonyan [7], Yulia Ulyanova [8], Daina Eglitis [9], and others. The second 
group comprises studies of ethnonational politics and ethnic nationalism in the 
Baltics after the collapse of the USSR. These are books and contributions by 
Timofey Agarin [10], Vladislav Vorotinikov [11], Mary Dakin [12], Aleksandr 
Dyukov and Vladimir Simindey [13], Vadim Musaev [13], Vadim Smirnov [15], 
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Aleksandr Sytin [16], and Ammon Cheskin [17]. Another important exploration 
of the ethnopolitical problems of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is the collection 
of papers Ethnic Policy in the Baltic States [18].
Analysis of the literature suggests that, despite the abundance of relevant 
studies, researchers often overlook how the transformation of the ethnopolitical 
movements, which propelled the Baltic towards independence, affected the polit-
ical evolution of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
This article aims to find out how much the movement influenced the devel-
opment of ethnic nationalism in modern Latvia. To this end, we consider the 
key development stages of Latvia’s popular ethnopolitical movement after 1985, 
identified and compare its changing ideological positions, and describe the pro-
cess of transformation as well as its role in the rise of an ethnocentric regime.
Methods
We assume that nationalism is a political ideology and practice that seeks to 
assert the priority of the nation as well as to develop an identity rooted in em-
bracing by individuals their belonging to that nation. Ethnic nationalism is the 
dominance of one ethnic group, which is believed to have the primary right to the 
statehood and territory, over other groups in political and social life.
Research into the institutionalisation of nationalism carried out in this article 
draws on the theoretical principles of constructivism. This approach suggests that 
ethnicity built on the idea of, or belief in, a common culture and history is a form 
of the social construction of cultural differences and that it allows actors to influ-
ence both nation-building and the development of nationalism.
This study relies for analytics and data on relevant literature, programmes, and 
the media. The method of qualitative content analysis is employed to analyse the 
ideological positions of the Latvian ethnopolitical movement, whereas the his-
torical method is used to explore the development and manifestations of Latvian 
nationalism.
The Popular Front of Latvia on its way to reforms
Although the popular fronts of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were officially 
established in 1988, the creation of such associations had been discussed with the 
CPSU Central Committee among other bodies, for several years after the declara-
tion of reforms by the Soviet Union authorities. The Latvian initiators of the pop-
ular movement raised their voices in June 1988 at an extended plenary meeting of 
artistic unions. The meeting was organised in Riga by the president of the Union 
of Soviet Authors of the Latvian SSR, a member of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Latvia (CPL), Jānis Peters. Most of the participants in the 
meeting were members of the CPL leadership and the intelligentsia. Encouraged 
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by anti-Soviet rallies, the latter would become the founding force behind the Pop-
ular Front of Latvia (PFL) [6, p. 38]. The artistic convention became a platform 
for political discussion on the status of the Latvian language, demography and 
migration, and the legitimacy of Latvia’s accession to the USSR. The meeting 
stressed the need for popular involvement in grassroots perestroika to ensure the 
irreversibility of the reforms. After the convention, supporters of the PFL, which 
included very different groups, started to participate in public events organized 
by Latvian opposition. Gradually, independence appeared on the agenda. ‘Sym-
bolic reclamation of the nation was a centrepiece of collective action in the early 
opposition period. Although overt political demands were still risky, and few in 
the opposition were prepared to ask for full national inde pendence, symbolic de-
mands, like those related to environmental protec tion, or symbolic deeds, such as 
commemorating the Stalinist mass deportations of Balts, were important. It was 
because ‘they laid bare problems widely believed to be symptomatic of a larger 
problem, the Soviet regime itself, Eglitis writes when describing public activity 
in Latvia from 1986 to the establishment of the Popular Front, which consolidat-
ed the opposition [9, p. 37].
The founding congress of the PFL, which took place on October 8—9, 1988, 
brought together 1,100 delegates who represented, according to estimates, up to 
110,000 people. The first factor in the popularity of the fronts was growing op-
positional sentiment and anti-communist solidarity [3, p. 335]. The second factor 
was firm support for popular movements, which were to become drivers of per-
estroika, from Gorbachev and his entourage. Opponents of the PFL noted that, 
from 1988, ideologists from the CPSU CC consulted the artistic intelligentsia 
and their allies about the founding of the organisation. The efforts of the initia-
tors were supported by state security bodies: the activists had full access to the 
republican media, whereas workplace party organisations were required to form 
local PFL groups.1 Probably, the Union leadership did count on the fronts to limit 
the influence of the conservative CPSU. Dmitry Lukashevich links the activity 
of the movements with the plans of Gorbachev and his supporters to introduce 
a multi-party system in the USSR. ‘Gorbachev understood that the CPSU was 
ceasing to be a tool to expedite perestroika; the party was putting the brakes on 
perestroika and threatening the political integrity of the secretary-general. The 
party had to be subdued, and Gorbachev had to ensure the irreversibility of pere-
stroika by assuming the office of President of the USSR’ [19, p. 48].
The first congress elected the governing body of the Popular Front: the one 
hundred strong Duma was chaired by the journalist Dianis Ivans. The congress 
adopted a charter [20, l. 200—207] and a resolution and agreed on a manifesto 
1 ‘Not a word about Russian occupants’. The deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia, 
Viktor Alksnis on the disintegration of the USSR. Lenta.ru. URL: https://lenta.ru/arti-
cles/2016/02/25/alksnis1 (accessed: 13.09.2019).
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[20, l. 207—224].2 The principal media outlet of the PFL was the Atmoda — a 
newspaper published in both Latvian and Russian. The name of the periodical, 
which means ‘awakening’, was an allusion to emerging national consciousness. 
The term was also applied to the Popular Front and the Latvian stage of the Baltic 
Singing Revolution.
The primary goal of the PFL was ‘to establish true popular rule and a dem-
ocratic state, to ensure cultural and economic prosperity, and to solve national 
problems’ [20, l. 200]. The first edition of the PFL manifesto focused on the role 
and principles of a socio-political organisation, democratisation and true popu-
lar rule, human rights, national relations, culture, ethics, education and research, 
social justice and humanisation, the economy, the environment, healthcare, and 
sports. The most radical points in the document waged a campaign against Stalin-
ism, the administrative-bureaucratic system of neo-Stalinism, and centralisation. 
It was proposed that the Latvian SSR be granted the right to veto any decision 
concerning the republic as well as the right to accede to international organi-
sations. The need for sovereignty was voiced. The manifesto emphasised that 
citizens of Latvia had to be masters of their land and solve all possible problems 
independently [20, l. 209]. The document stressed the need for an independent 
constitutional court and constitutional control exercised by the republican pros-
ecution service, for the division of powers in the republic, and for the separation 
of the party from the state. Although all the above questioned the leading role 
and political monopoly of the CPSU, the manifesto did not call for an open con-
frontation with the party, nor did it mention Latvia’s possible secession from the 
USSR. Moreover, all the ideas and plans of the PFL were presented as being in 
good agreement with the ideas of Leninism, Soviet perestroika, and the principles 
of socialism and humanism. The final resolution declared determined and unwav-
ering support for the new party line.
In its manifesto, the Popular Front urged the reform of citizenship laws, an 
end to immigration, and a revision of the ethnonational policy. The PFL, which 
welcomed an objective interpretation of Latvian history, demanded in the same 
document that the incorporation of the republic in the USSR be recognised as 
forcible. The Soviet policy of national nihilism was viewed as the cause of the de-
formation and deterioration of national relations — the processes that, alongside 
immigration, had wronged the Latvians and other ethnic groups. The manifesto 
argued that uncontrolled migration had made the Latvian people, for the first time 
in its history, a minority in its own land and threatened its existence and statehood 
[20, l.??]. Although the PFL did not support the idea of expelling ‘non-natives’, it 
saw immigrants from other Soviet republics as victims of Stalin’s national policy. 
The Latvian authorities had to help those willing to return to their homelands. 
The PFL condemned the mechanical unification of nationalities, especially in 
schools and kindergartens.
2 Latvijas Tautas frontes dibināšanas kongress. 1988. g. 8., 9. oktobris. Rezolūcijas // Padom-
ju Jaunatne. 1988. g. 19. oktobrī.
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The PFL demanded that the Latvian language be recognised as the official 
language. The movement addressed the problem of representation of the titular 
nation in the Soviets of the republic and proposed that legislative and represen-
tative ethnic quotas should be introduced. The manifesto read that the Latvian 
people had the status of the indigenous nation since Latvia was the historical 
land of the Latvians, the only place in the world where the Latvian nation, the 
Latvian language, and Latvian culture could preserve themselves and develop 
[20, l. 213]. The PFL, however, advocated the rights of any national minority 
for educational and cultural autonomy. That way, the movement could ensure 
the loyalty of local Russian speakers and recruit new supporters. At the time, 
non-titular ethnic groups accounted for about half the population of the republic. 
The PFL was active in protecting the ethnic interests of all nationalities living 
in Latvia, their languages, cultures, education, and religious consciousness. The 
movement denounced any attempts to stir ethnic hostility or to destroy the dignity 
of any resident of the Latvian SSR. The manifesto emphasised that the protection 
of the native tongue and culture should be the responsibility of any citizen of the 
republic, regardless of his or her nationality [20, l. 213].
Thus, the central demands of those who supported the reform of the Soviet 
system were sovereignty and broad autonomy in a federative structure. From 
the perspective of national relations, the future of Latvia lay in building a single 
poly-ethnic state that guarded the interests of the majority. Right at the start, how-
ever, the foundation was laid for the ethnopolitical mobilisation of the Latvians 
through appeals to their indigenous origins and discriminated-against position in 
the Soviet Union.
The emergence of the ethnopolitical movement
The PFL was immediately supported by the Republican leadership while the 
Union authorities were losing ideological and recruitment control over Latvia’s 
elite. The ideas of the PFL were shared by part of the Communist nomenklatura, 
the so-called ‘ethnic appointees’. As Sytin writes, members of the economic and 
party leadership of the Baltic republics mostly encouraged the popular fronts, 
trying to infiltrate them in an attempt to preserve their own high standing [16]. 
High-ranking opponents of the fronts were accused of provocations and benefit-
ting from the stagnation.
One of the most influential advocates of the PFL was the secretary for ideolo-
gy of the CPL CC, Anatoly Gorbunov, who was elected the chair of the Supreme 
Soviet of the Latvian SSR on October 6, 1988. On the same day, he signed the 
resolution of the Supreme Soviet ‘On the status of the Latvian language’,3 which 
recognised Latvian as the official language of the republic and instructed the 
3 Latvijas PSR Augstākās padomes lēmums par latviešu valodas status. URL: http://www.
vvk.lv/index.php?sadala=135&id=167 (accessed: 13.09.2019).
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executive bodies to develop measures to enshrine the language in the Consti-
tution, to promote its study and use in education and official communication. 
The resolution was declared to follow the principles of Lenin’s national politics, 
resolutions of the 19th All-union Conference of the CPSU, and the postulate that 
national values and the Latvian language had not been neglected in the republic. 
According to the document, the Russian language retained its role of the language 
of federal relations; citizens had the right to use the language in communication 
with authorities. The very first initiative to assert the priority of the Latvian lan-
guage was the first step towards the institutionalisation of ethnic nationalism in 
its practice aspect [21].
The PFL gained representation in republican authorities after its first electoral 
success of March–April 1989. The Popular Front of Latvia, which had estab-
lished its commitment to the transformation of the state as well as the political 
and economic sovereignty of the republic, won 30 seats in the supreme Union 
authority. Latvian voters elected deputies across 40 national-territorial and ter-
ritorial districts. Only five seats were secured by the CPL and the International 
Front of Workers (Interfront). The impressive results of the PFL were partly owed 
to the peculiar division into electoral districts, which translated into an uneven 
representation of urban and rural residents, the titular nation and minorities [12, 
pp. 17—18].
In spring–summer 1989, the PFL was preparing for the second congress. In 
the process, it radically revised its proposals on the socio-political future of Lat-
via. On May 31 the board of the Duma published an appeal to the members of the 
Popular Front. The document stressed the impossibility of securing sovereignty 
while being part of the USSR and justified parliamentary struggle for political 
and economic independence as well as for a transformation of the governance 
structure. The leadership of the PFL thought it necessary to amend the constitu-
tion to abolish the supremacy of Soviet laws in Latvia and, for the Supreme So-
viet of the Latvian USSR, to adopt a declaration of sovereignty and laws on eco-
nomic independence. This appeal of the Popular Front could be explained by final 
disillusionment with perestroika [22, l. 5]. Further decisions taken by the PFL 
suggests that it was considering a plan for Front-led secession from the USSR.
On July 16, 1989, the Ideological Platform of the PFL was adopted to consol-
idate the Latvian population of different nationalities [20, l. 261—262]. The dec-
laration of independence by democratic Latvia was announced the primary goal 
of the organisation. The Latvian nation was named the foundation of sovereignty. 
Remarkably, alongside acknowledging all rights and freedoms of the residents of 
the republic regardless of their social status, nationality, and religious beliefs, the 
document proposed to grant citizenship only to those who supported the idea of 
independence and had lived in Latvia for at least ten years before the registration. 
On the one hand, this measure had to stop immigration. On the other, its main 
consequence would have been discrimination against a significant part of Latvian 
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Russian speakers who did not want to leave the republic. The idea of residential 
qualification was so controversial that, by autumn 1989, the Popular Front did 
not insist on the immediate adoption of new citizenship laws any more [2, p. 19].
In response to the appeals of the PFL, the secession of the republic from the 
USSR was expedited by regulations adopted by the Latvian Supreme Soviet in 
1989, including the declaration ‘On the state sovereignty of Latvia’.4 The docu-
ment declared that Latvia had to become the successor of the independent demo-
cratic republic of 1917—1920, which was stripped of its sovereignty by ‘Stalin’s 
unlawful foreign policy’. Therefore, the ultimate goal was to restore the state-
hood established for the Latvian people, which had preserved its unique language 
and culture, to exercise its right to independent development and national self-de-
termination. This approach provided an ideological framework for the new line of 
policy [23]. Although the declaration said that the independence of the people of 
Latvia was a formal guarantee of the prosperity of the Latvian nation and all the 
other ethnic groups living in the republic, it gave an impetus to official struggle 
against the Soviet legacy, particularly, changes to the interpretation of the histor-
ical past. Later it had an immediate effect on the ethnonational policy since the 
doctrine of occupation both led to discord and gave grounds for a discriminatory 
policy against national minorities. Vorotnikov writes that the myth of occupation 
contributed to the image of Russia as the primaeval enemy that pursues an impe-
rial and aggressive policy towards smaller nations, on the one hand, and justified 
the ‘return to Europe’, on the other [11].
In October 1989, the second PFL congress took place. The movement finally 
rejected perestroika in favour of a ‘national-democratic revolution’ [8, p. 141]. 
At the time, the Popular Front had over 210,000 members who were represented 
at the congress by 1,061 delegates, mostly ethnic Latvians. Ivans retained his 
position of the chair, and the duma was re-elected at the convention. Orientation 
towards independence and a democratic parliamentary republic with a market 
economy required changes to the basic documents of the organisation.
The second edition of the PFL manifesto contained sections dedicated to the 
political system and independence of Latvia, as well as to the freedom of con-
sciousness and religion, ecology, and demilitarisation.5 Another significant part of 
the document openly denied the monopoly of the CPSU to power and its ideolog-
ical control over social life. The manifesto also declared the intention of the Pop-
ular Front as an independent political force to take part in the upcoming election 
to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR.
4 Latvijas PSR Augstākās padomes deklarācija par Latvijas valsts suverenitāti. URL: http://
www.saeima.lv/4maijs/docs/d_28julijs.htm (accessed: 15.09.2019).
5 The manifesto of the Popular Front of Latvia. New sociopolitical movements and organisa-
tions in the USSR.Documents and materials. Moscow, 1990. Part 2. Pp. 155—187.
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As to the national question, the second edition of the manifesto advocated 
the rights and freedoms of all people regardless of their origin, social standing, 
beliefs, and occupation. The Popular Front supported the idea of integration with-
in the current multi-national structure of society and stressed the importance of 
meeting the cultural needs of all ethnic groups. It denounced the image of the 
enemy, national arrogance, chauvinism, anti-Semitism, Russophobia, national 
protectionism, nihilism, and imperial attitudes. It was articulated at the congress 
that the way to independence lay through democratisation [24, l. 116].
Of equal significance were the resolutions that the PFL adopted at the second 
congress. In relation to state-building, the documents called for the republican 
authorities to proclaim the declaration of Latvia’s accession to the USSR ille-
gal. It was also proposed to grant citizenship only to those who had lived in 
the republic before 1940. The position of the Popular Front on citizenship was 
not entirely consistent: the manifesto did not mention residential qualification 
or any other naturalisation condition for permanent residents. Citizenship was 
promised to anyone who voiced his or her intention to acquire Latvian citizen-
ship and pursue a future in the republic. That way, the Popular Front of Latvia 
was leading Russian speakers to expect democratic inclusion and Latvians, eth-
nic democracy [25, p. 18].
The inclusive attitudes of the manifesto and the political appeals made by 
members of the movement in 1988—1989 encourage some Western research-
ers to classify the PFL as a trans-ethnic or transnational civil association. This 
point of view is made explicit by the historian Mara Lazda, who attempts at a 
revision of the ethnonational interpretation of the PFL’s activities [5]. Having 
analysed publications in the Atmoda, the membership of the Popular Front, and 
its international contacts, she concludes that the movement was open to all eth-
nic groups and it envisaged an association of national and cultural autonomies. 
Lazda believes that the Popular Front married the nationalism of the titular nation 
with the ideas of integration and kept itself at a distance from the Soviet policy 
of internationalism. She admits, however, that civil and language laws adopted 
later on the initiative of the Popular Front turned into an ideational framework 
to strengthen Latvia’s independence were a deviation from democratic ideals. 
Moreover, as other international experts emphasise, those measures were overt 
attempts to prompt the emigration of non-Latvian residents [12, p. 34]. We be-
lieve that it is important to discuss the transformation of the PFL when exploring 
these issues. Already during the preparation for the election to the Supreme So-
viet of the Latvian SSR6 in March — April 1990, the PFL, once a civil society 
institution [26, pp. 113—114], turned into a separatist ethnopolitical movement 
6 Amendments to the Constitution of the Latvian SSR of January 1990 stripped the Com-
munist Party of its special status. The citizens were granted the right to create independent 
political parties.
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that was supported by most of the population and had enormous influence on po-
litical processes in the republic. Although the democratic values expressed in the 
manifesto and publications of the PFL remained a priority, the plan to establish 
them lost its urgency.
The turn to ethnocracy
In the parliamentary election, the PFL-led coalition won 131 out of 201 seats: 
the anti-system opposition became the ruling force. The supporter of the move-
ment, Gorbunov, kept his position of the chair of the Supreme Council. Ivans 
became the vice-speaker of the parliament; the deputy chair of the Popular Front, 
Ivars Godmanis, headed the cabinet of the republic. Some key positions in the 
government were also taken by PFL members.
On May 4, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR adopted the dec-
laration ‘On the restoration of independence of the Republic of Latvia’.7 The 
document was prepared by the PFL. One hundred thirty-eight deputies, most of 
them ethnic Latvians, voted for the document; one abstained; fifty-seven refused 
to take part in the voting. The declaration proclaimed the USSR’s ‘act of aggres-
sion’ of 1940 a war crime and the Soviet rule illegal and anti-constitutional. It 
also announced the ‘restoration’ of Latvia’s sovereignty and the enactment of 
four articles of the 1992 constitution: on independence, power vested in the peo-
ple, national borders, and elections to the Saeima. The document marked the be-
ginning of the transition to actual independence. In the process, the PFL encoun-
tered growing discontent among non-titular ethnic groups, Moscow’s refusal to 
support the declaration adopted by the Supreme Council of the republic, the rise 
of new opposition in the parliament, including the ‘Equal Rights’ faction, and le-
gal inconsistencies. Despite the declared sovereignty, the country had to observe 
pre-Soviet and Soviet laws and international legal rules. Technically, that made it 
possible for Latvian citizens to exercise their economic, cultural, social, and po-
litical rights. Until today, the question whether the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian 
SSR had the power to ‘restore’ laws, including the outdated constitution, which 
was immediately revised, remains a subject of legal debate. The ‘restoration’ of 
the republican constitution pursued primarily symbolic goals and reinforced the 
official doctrine of occupation.
The ideology of the transitional period was approved at the third PFL con-
gress, which took place in October 1990. The convention elected a new chair — a 
doctor of Lithuanian descent, Romualds Ražuks. It discussed the preparation of 
new PFL first- and second-line leaders. The latter were to replace their seniors 
who had taken public office. PFL leaders were instructed to devise a development 
plan for the republic.
7 Latvijas PSR Augstākās padomes deklarācija par Latvijas Republikas neatkarības atS-
jaunošanu. URL: https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=75539&mode=DOC (accessed: 20.09.2019).
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Dramatically new accents appeared in the resulting manifesto,8 namely, radi-
calisation and commitment to ethnic nationalism. The new footing of the move-
ment was the vision of both democratic and ‘Latvian’ Latvia. The nation was 
interpreted from a primordial perspective. Nationalism was institutionalised and 
turned into the ideological framework for solidarity and identity [27, p. 92]. The 
new PFL manifesto subjected international relations to the right of the Latvians 
to self-determination. The document declared the support of the Latvian state for 
the economic and cultural development of the indigenous peoples of Latvia — 
Latvians and Livonians [24, l. 210]. The mention of the small ethnic group was 
mostly symbolic. The notions ‘national’ and ‘Latvian’ were to be treated as equal. 
The PFL became the organisation that protected the Latvian people, its existence, 
and survival [24, l. 206]. The manifesto said that the PFL would struggle to re-
claim the Latvian nation and to ensure its revival and the prosperity of all citizens 
of Latvia.
Remarkably, the third congress of the PFL demanded that Latvian citizenship 
be granted only to those who had been citizens of the republic as of June 17, 
1940, and their direct descendants. Citizens’ committees, which were declared 
the PFL’s allies by its chair, and the Movement for National Independence, with 
which the organisation had never agreed before in public, pursued the same goal.
The antipathy of Moscow, the CPSU, and the CPL to the new opposition and 
the political decisions made under the aegis of the PFL led to diarchy and grow-
ing conflict. In effect, Latvia became independent only in 1991. On August 21, 
the republican Supreme Council adopted the constitutional law ‘On the national 
status of the Republic of Latvia’,9 which marked the end of the transitional peri-
od. The Soviet was vested with the supreme power until the convocation of the 
Saeima. On August 24, the decree ‘On the recognition of the independence of the 
Republic of Latvia’ was signed by the president of the USSR. On September 5, 
independence was recognised by the State Council of the USSR.
Latvian independence made a bad situation worse for those who wanted Lat-
via to remain part of the USSR and for members of non-titular nations whose 
loyalty was questioned by the republican authorities. On October 15, 1991, the 
Supreme Soviet rejected the idea of automatic citizenship for all residents of the 
republic and adopted the resolution ‘On the restoration of the right of citizens and 
the basic conditions for naturalisation’. The legal framework for citizenship was 
developed more than three years later. Immediately after independence, however, 
the authorities of ‘democratic’ Latvia made a major contribution to discrimina-
tion against approximately a third of the country’s population (primarily, Russian 
speakers who had moved to the republic after 1940 and their descendants); that 
was very much in line with the plans of the PFL and the appeals of nationalists 
[18, p. 72]. As a result, only 64% of the population were eligible to participate 
8 Latvijas Tautas fronte. III kongress. Programma. Statuti. Rezolucijas. LTF. Riga, 1990.
9 Latvijas Republikas konstitucionālais likums par Latvijas Republikas valstisko statusu. 
URL: https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=69512 (accessed: 23.09.2019).
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in elections and protect their interests in the political arena [28]. The problem of 
citizenship still prevents the country from reaching a satisfactory level of demo-
cratic development [29].
During Latvia’s secession from the USSR, its Russian speakers were atomised 
and ideologically adrift. Some of them supported the Communist authorities; oth-
ers, reforms, the Popular front, and independence. The latter placed their trust in 
the new leadership, which did not feel urged to declared its plans to discriminate 
against the ‘immigrants’, whom it viewed as the legacy of the ‘Soviet occupation’ 
[14]. At the peak of the transition, over a half of the Russian speakers either sup-
ported or was neutral to the PFL. As a result, Latvia’s way to independence was 
relatively peaceful [15]. Anti-system and supra-ethnic opposition emerged as a 
response to the insufficient inclusivity of the political system, as a self-organisa-
tion effort of future ‘aliens’. The Popular Front failed to ensure democratisation 
after destroying Soviet authoritarianism, as some researchers believe [4, p. 127].
Secession from the Soviet Union was countered by Interfront from October 
1988. After the 1990 election, some of its members joined the ‘Equal Rights’ par-
ty. Founded by ethnic Russians and communists [16] as a response to the PFL’s 
radical statements regarding national minorities, Interfront had about 300,000 
members. Unable to block decisions made by the PFL in the Supreme Soviet 
of the republic, Latvia’s Interfront took it to the streets to raise awareness of the 
official language controversy and the rights of the non-titular population. The 
movement went as far as to demand that a state of emergency be imposed and 
the republic be governed directly from Moscow. All those efforts were, however, 
futile. After the recognition of Latvian independence by the Union leadership, 
Interfront was banned alongside the CPL. Their members, who ‘acted against the 
republic’ after January 13, 1991, are still officially denied Latvian citizenship.
In the 1993 Saeima election, in which about 716,000 people could not take 
part, ethnic Latvians won 88 out of 100 seats. For comparison, in the Supreme 
Soviet, the titular nation was represented by 139 people out of the 201 deputies. 
Having secured slightly over 2.6% of the votes, the PFL did not pass the 4% 
electoral threshold. Six years later, after unsuccessful attempts to become a polit-
ical party, the Popular Front dissolved. There are manifold reasons why the PFL 
failed in the 1993 election: the movement had neither new ideas nor concrete 
proposals except for the populist mantra that sovereignty was ‘divine grace’ and 
a cure-all; new parties were recruiting PFL members amid internal conflicts in 
the movement; its leaders were lacking skills of political administration; its pop-
ularity was declining, particularly, among non-titular ethnic groups; workplace 
organisations were disbanded after the CPL and trade unions had lost their con-
trolling influence.
The winner of the Saeima election was the right-wing party ‘Latvian Way’, 
established in 1993. It got 32.4% of the votes. Among its founders was the mem-
ber of the PFL, Gorbunov, who once again headed the parliament. The National 
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Independence Movement, which had been transformed into a party, came second 
with 13.3%. Alongside the newly-popular nationalist and right parties, the ‘Equal 
Rights’ party was also represented in the parliament. It took, however, only seven 
seats. The party was founded on the basis of the ‘Equal Rights’ faction, which 
had 57 seats in the Supreme Soviet and advanced the interests of Latvian Russian 
speakers, former communists, and supporters of the USSR.
Popular anti-systemic supra-ethnic opposition in Latvia disappeared for the 
following reasons: the illegal status of higher-level organisations; the absence of 
a clear course of action; the low morale of the followers after the disintegration of 
the USSR; a relatively low level of international tension explained, among other 
things, by partial support for independence by the Russian speakers; naturalisa-
tion opportunities and the absence of barriers in day-to-day life for most minori-
ties. The ethnonational policy, which asserted the priority of the titular nation, 
confronted now stateless Russian speakers with the choice — to assimilate or to 
remain excluded from the political process. From the mid-1990s, the number of 
residents reduced by more than 500,000 people. As on July 1, 2019, they account-
ed for only 10.5% of the population.10
Few in number, Russian-leaning parties and organisations tried to make a dif-
ference by protecting the interests and rights of the community. Most of their 
efforts were countered by the authorities, and they lacked electoral support. The 
other political forces played by the rules that had been established with the help 
of the PFL. Therefore, the supra-ethnic oppositional parties that advocate the idea 
of a civil nation are not anti-systemic. Despite the fragmented and often inconsis-
tent identity of the Russian speakers, proof of which is the insufficient political 
and territorial unification around common cultural preferences [17], most of them 
vote for left and social-democratic parties.11
Regardless of its actual post-Communist achievements in democratic build-
ing, Latvia remains the least democratic Baltic State because of its alien problem. 
After independence, the percentage of the discriminated population has fallen. 
The result has been attained, however, by assimilation and emigration rather than 
the integration of non-titular ethnic groups. Against this background, nationalism 
continues to give the elite a political foothold and grants access to power, its 
resources, and tools to keep it. Having provided an ideological framework for 
nation-building, nationalism is uniting the titular population. Neither the elite 
nor ordinary members of the ethnic majority are willing to make radical changes. 
Therefore, in the near future, the ethic democracy model will not be replaced by 
a better alternative.
10 Pilsonības un migrācijas lietu pārvalde. Latvijas iedzīvotāju skaits pašvaldībās. URL: 
https://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/ISPV_Pasvaldibas_iedzivotaju_skaits01072019.pdf 
(acces sed: 20.09.2019).
11 A vivid example is the opposition party Harmony, which has been coming first in parlia-
mentary elections since 2011.
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Conclusion
When the USSR leadership announced perestroika at the turn of the 1990s, the 
Popular Front of Latvia, a socio-political movement was established to support 
reforms and to lead Latvia to independence. It did not take long for the Popular 
Front to evolve from a late-Soviet civil institution first into a separatist ethnopo-
litical movement and later into a major political force. Without significant oppo-
sition from communists and the Union authorities, it initiated the ‘restoration’ of 
Latvia’s sovereignty, leading to ethnic segregation of the population.
As the ideology of the Popular Front of Latvia, which once counted on support 
from national minorities, started to change, the idea of standing up for the dem-
ocratic rights and interests of all residents of the Republic was abandoned. The 
Popular Front ensured the ethnopolitical mobilisation of the Latvians and created 
grounds for the exclusion of the Russian speakers who had moved to Latvia after 
1940 and their descendants from political life.
Having achieved its primary goal, the independence of the country, the Popu-
lar Front of Latvia could neither function politically nor exist in the system that 
it had created. The PFL-encouraged attitude to minorities, who faced political, 
social, economic, and cultural discrimination, and the priority given to the titular 
nation contributed to the institutionalisation of ethnical nationalism as well as the 
emergence of a regime that is not democratic since it eliminated national equality 
and abandoned the principles of universal suffrage.
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